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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15408

-vsMARK LESLIE LARSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with automobile homicide,
in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§

76-5-207 {Supp. 1977),

a felony of the third degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before a jury, the Honorable
Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge, presiding.
returned a verdict of guilty.

The jury

Appellant was sentenced to

serve an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.

Execution of the sentence was

suspended and appellant placed on probation on condition
that he serve six months in the Utah County Jail, pay a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fine of $1,000, and that he drive no motor vehicle during
his probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirmir.
the judgment and sentence rendered below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 19, 1976, Detective Sergeant Owen
Quarnberg of the Utah County Sheriff's Department observed
a vehicle travelling south on Interstate 15 at a high rate
of speed (T.11).

Detective Quarnberg pursued the vehicle,

and observed that it was travelling at a speed in excess
of 100 miles per hour (T.11,12).

Sergeant Quarnberg and

Trooper Doug Staheli of the Utah Highway Patrol observed
a collision between the suspect vehicle and a second car,
and both officers arrived at the scene of the accident
within a few seconds of the collision (T.12,20-21).

Both

vehicles had overturned as a result of the accident; the
appellant was the only occupant of the suspect vehicle;
Mr. and Mrs. Mlejnek were found inside the second car;
and the two Mlejnek children were found a short distance
away, having been thrown from their car by the force of
the collision (T.13,20-21).

The Mlejneks were taken to

a hospital.
A number of empty beer cans were found inside

-2-
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appellant's car, and both officers observed that the
appellant had a strong odor of alcohol and was profane
and abusive (T.16-17,21-22).

Trooper Staheli also observed

that the appellant's face was flushed, that his eyes were
bloodshot and watery, that he was unsteady on his feet,
and that the appellant's speech was slurred and confused
(T.21-22).

Officer Staheli gave his opinion that the

appellant was under the influence of alcohol and unable
to operate a motor vehicle safely (T.23).
The appellant was then placed in the custody of
Trooper Don Mcrill of the Utah Highway Patrol.

Trooper

Mcrill also observed that the appellant's speech was
slurred, and that his manner was belligerent and abusive
(T.43-45).

The appellant stated in Trooper Merill's

presence that "I must be drunker than I thought" and made
other statements indicating that he was intoxicated (T.45).
Trooper Mcrill gave his opinion that the appellant was
under the influence of alcohol and unable to operate a
motor vehicle safely (T.45).

Trooper Mcrill administered

a breathalyzer test to the appellant, and the test
indicated that the appellant had a blood alcohol content
of 0.13 percent (T.55)

{State's Exhibit No. 1).

Andrew M°iejnek and his family reside in Port
Huron, Michigan; and on June 19, 1976, they were southbound

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

on Interstate 15 enroute to a vacation in California (T.2
At the time of the accident, they were travelling at
approximately 50 miles per hour, and observed no other
vehicle prior to the collision (T.30).

Mrs. Sandra

Mlejnek sustained serious injuries as a result of the
accident; her pelvis was fractured, all of the ligaments
in left knee were torn, her lung was inflated (sic), her
check bone was broken, her mouth was ripped open, and she
suffered burns on her right foot and left leg (T.37).
At the time of the accident, Sandra Mlejnek was
six and one-half months pregnant (T.32).

Mrs. Mlejnek

and her physician had calculated the child's probable
conception date as January 3 or 4, 1976, and had
a due date of October 3, 1976 (T.33).

projec~

The mother had fel

fetal movement shortly before the collision, but felt no
fetal movement after the collision (T.34-35,37).
Following the collision, Mrs. Mlejnek was
by Dr. Lynn Dalton, a physician specializing in
(T.67).

tre~

gynecol~

Dr. Dalton was unable to detect any fetal heart

tones, and determined that the child was dead (T.68).
After waiting a period of time to allow the mother to
recover from her other injuries, Dr. Dalton induced labor
and caused the dead featus to be delivered (T.69).

Dr.

Dalton examined the fetus, and found that it had been
dead for some time.

The placenta was also examined, and
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Dr. Dalton discovered a large blood clot around it (T.69).
The witness expressed his opinion that the fetus died
as a result of a traumatic blow (T.70).

The fetus was

found to be of average size for a 26 week old fetus, and
Dr. Dalton approximated its weight at one and one-half
pounds (T.72).

Dr. Dalton testified that a one and

one-half pound baby had a 25 percent statistical chance
of survival outside of the womb, and that the chance of
survival would go as high as 50 percent if the fetus had
weighed two pounds, but that the chance of survival
would have been as low of 5 percent if the fetus had
weighed only one pound (T.71).
At the close of the State's case, the appellant
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that an
unborn fetus is not "another" within the meaning of Utah
Code Ann.

§

76-5-207 (Supp. 1977).

motion (T.78).

The court denied the

The defendant excepted to jury instruction

Nos. 5 and 11.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN UNBORN VIABLE FETUS IS "ANOTHER" WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN.
§

76-5-207 (SUPP. 1977).
Respondent submits that this point on appeal

presents a single issue:

was it the legislative intent
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to include unborn but viable persons within the protectio
of the automobile homicide statute which prohibits the
causing of death of "another"?

Respondent avers that

this question must be answered affirmatively because such
a legislative intent can be discerned from the totality
of the Utah Criminal Code.

Respondent further submits

that the recognition of a viable fetus as "another" is
the better rule of law and is in accord with the trend
of the law as announced by a majority of American
jurisdictions.
A.

THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO PUNISH THE

KILLING OF A VIABLE FETUS UNDER THE GENERAL HOMICIDE
STATUTES OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE.
Under the coP.lIT\on law, the killing of an unborn
viable child was not murder, although it was a "great
misprision."

This common law rule was specifically

abrogated by Utah Code Ann.

§

76-1-105 (Supp. 1977):

"Common law crimes are
abolished and no conduct is
a crime unless made so by this
code, other applicable statute
or ordinance."
The common law rule requiring live birth as an element
of homicide is therefore not involved in this appeal.
The statute in issue is Utah Code Ann.
76-5-207 (Supp. 1977), which provides:

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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§

"(l) Criminal homicide
constitutes automobile homicide
if the actor, while under the
influence of intoxicating
liquor, a controlled substance,
or any drug, to a degree which
renders the actor incapable of
safely driving a vehicle, causes
the death of another by operating
a motor vehicle in a negligent
manner."
(Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201 (Supp. 1977), states:
"A person commits criminal
homicide if he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or with
criminal negligence unlawfully
causes the death of another."
(Emphasis added.)
A comparison of these sections reveals that the
word "another" in the automobile homicide statute refers
grammatically to another "actor" or another "person" (as
used in Section 76-5-201).

These terms are defined in Utah

Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (Supp. 1977):
"(3) 'Actor'means a person
whose criminal responsibility
is in issue in a criminal action.

*

*

*

(5)
'Person' means an
individual, public or private
corporation, government, partnership,
or unincorporated association."
{Emphasis added.)
The word "another" therefore refers to a person or an
individual.

The Utah Criminal Code contains no further

definitional aids, and other areas of the code must
therefore be analyzed to determine if the legislature
intended to include unborn persons within the ambit of
Sponsored"another."
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
t.he term
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Two important sources used by the Utah
Legislature in its 1973 revision of the criminal
code were the Model Penal Code and the Penal Code
of New Hampshire.
133-134.

Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline,

Both of these codes limit the definition of

"human being" or "another" so as not to include an
unborn child as a victim of a homicide.
Code

§

210.D, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

Vol. 1974).

§

Model Penal

630:l(IV)

(Repl.

Respondent submits that the omission of

such a limiting definition from the Utah Criminal Code
is significant, and indicates a legislative intent to
include unborn but viable fetuses within the protection
of the homicide statutes.
Another area of the Utah Criminal Code which
manifests an acute legislative concern for the protection
of fetal life is the criminal abortion section, Utah Coili
Ann. § 76-7-302 (Supp. 1977), which provides:
"An abortion may be performed
in the state only under the following
circumstances • . • (3) If performed
when the unborn child is sufficiently
developed to have any reasonable possibili
of survival outside its mother's womb,
the abortion is necessary to save the lifi
of the pregnant woman or to prevent serio1
and permanent damage to her health."
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-7-307 (Supp. 1977), providE
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"If an abortion is performed
when the unborn child is sufficiently
developed to have any reasonable
possibility of survival outside of its
mother's womb, the medical procedure
used must be that which, in the best
medical judgment of the physician,
will give the unborn child the best
chance of survival. No medical
procedure designed to kill or injure
an unborn child may be used unless
necessary in the opinion of the
women's physician, to save her life
or prevent serious and permanent damage
to her health."
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-308 (Supp. 1977), provides:
"Consistent with the purpose of
saving the life of the woman or preventing serious and permanent damage
to the woman's health, the physician
performing the abortion must use all
of his medical skills to attempt to
promote, preserve and maintain the life
of any unborn child sufficiently developed
to have any reasonable possibility of
survival outside of the mother's womb."
A physician who performs an abortion which is not
authorized by law is guilty of a second degree felony, and
a physician who fails to use all of his medical skill to
protect the life of an unborn viable fetus during an
authorized abortion is guilty of a third degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-314 (Supp. 1977).

It would be

inconsistent to punish a physician for causing a viable
fetus's death during an authorized abortion, but allow
a drunken driver to kill a similar fetus without being

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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punished.

Respondent submits that the Utah criminal

abortion statutes indicate a legislative intent to
protect fetal life, and demonstrate that the legislature
understands a fetus to achieve "personhood" prior to
birth.
The strongest indication of the legislative
intent can be found in a joint resolution passed by the
same legislature which originally enacted the automobile
homicide statute.

House Joint Res. 30, Laws of Utah

(1973), provides:
"Be it resolved by the Legislature
of the State of Utah:
That the Congress of the United
States take without delay such action as
necessary, including a Constitutional
amendment if needed, to preserve the
right to life of unborn children and to
forestall a wholesale wave of lifetaking
abortions which could result from the
recent decision of the Supreme Court."
There can be no doubt that the Utah Legislature

conside~

human life to begin prior to birth.
Respondent submits that the failure of the
Legislature to enact a limited definition of "person,"
the provisions of the criminal abortion statutes, and th
House Joint Res. 30 all indicate a legislative concept~
of "person-ness" which embraces the unborn viable child
as well as the child which is born alive.

The automobil

homicide statute must be read in context with this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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legislative concept.

Respondent submits that a

comparison of the automobile homicide statute with
other relevant indicia of legislative intent leads to
the conclusion that an unborn viable fetus is "another"
within the meaning of the statute.
B.

THE TREND OF THE LAW IS TO RECOGNIZE

THE KILLING OF A VIABLE FETUS AS THE KILLING OF A
PERSON.
Respondent submits that the holding of the
court below that a viable fetus can be the victim of
a homicide is in accord with the better rule of law in
this country and recognizes the scientific fact that
there is no significant biological difference between
a viable infant within his mother's womb and an infant
recently expelled from the womb by the process of birth.
The purpose of a homicide statute is to protect human
life.

That purpose is best served when life is protected

from the moment it has independent significance.

To rely

on live birth as the criterion for "person-ness" is to
depend on the fortuity of the location of the life without
the uterus and to ignore the quality of the life taken.
The artificial nature of the live birth requirement was
commented on in Tribe, Foreward: Toward a Model of Roles
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
27-28 (1973):

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ll-

"
. . the viable fetus may be
removed in precisely the same way
in late pregnancy--whether surgically
or by chemically induced labor--regardless of one's intentions as to its
ultimate survival. A premature birth
followed by the deliberate killing of
what the doctor had removed or delivered
would look and sound the same whether
the intent to kill had been formed only
after the birth was completed or had
been present throughout the episode. To
call the first of these acts 'infanticide'
and the second 'abortion' or even
'feticide' is to play with names that
bespeak no relevant difference.
Viability thus marks a point after
which a secular state could properly
conclude that permitting abortion would
be tantamount to permitting murder, ••
or the secular and quite practical ground
that a state wishing to prevent the kill~
of infants simply has no way to distinguL
the deliberate destruction of the latter
from what is involved in postviability
abortions.
It is not only that such
abortions lie close to infanticide and
hence not far from other horrors along
the 'slippery slope' but rather that in
every functional sense, they occupy the
same place on that fabled plane."
(Emphasis added.)
The negligent killing of a viable fetus is similarly
functionally indistinguishable from negligently causing
the death of an infant.

Live birth is a purely artificL

line to draw for purposes of a homicide prosecution, but
viability is a significant distinction.

As the United

States Supreme Court conceded in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1
164

(1973):
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"With respect to the State's
important and legitimate interest
in potential life, the 'compelling'
point is at viability. This is so
because the fetus then has the
capability of meaningful life
outside of the mother's womb.
State regulation protective of
fetal life after viability thus
has both logical and biological
justifications."
The live birth requirement for homicide
is not predicated on any relevant medical criteria,
and appears to be based in part on the ignorant
assumption that, prior to birth, a fetus is only part
of its mother.

See generally Mellman, Legal Concepts

of Human Life:

The Infanticide Doctrines, 52 Marq. L.

Rev. 105 (1968).
The live birth requirement is not only
artificial and unscientific, but unworkable as well.
This criticism of the rule was voiced in People v. Chavez,
77 Cal.App.2d 621, 176 P.2d 92, 94 (1947):
"There is no sound reason why
an infant should not be considered
a human being when born or removed
from the body of its mother, when it
has reached that stage of development
where it is capable of living an
independent life as a separate being
and where in the natural course of
events it will so live if given normal
and reasonable care • • • these questions
should be met and decided on the basis of
whether or not a living baby with the
natural possibility and probability of
growth and development was being born,
rather than on any hard and fast
technical rule establishing a legal
fiction that the infant being born was
not a human being because some part of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library
Services and Technology
Act, administered
by thenot
Utah State
Library. fully
process
of birth
had
been
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
completed."

Thus, the Court in Chavez held that a complete
live birth need not be shown for a homicide prosecution,
and only required a showing of viability during the birth
process.

This reasoning was approved and followed in

Singleton v. State, 35 So.2d 375 (Ala. App. 1948).
The common law rule requiring a live birth for
a homicide prosecution, although well-established, is
neither reasonable, scientific nor practical.
Respondent urges this Court to adopt as its
rule of decision in this case the holding of the

majori~

of American courts as to the law of wrongful death for
unborn viable fetuses.

Appellant has recognized the

appropriateness of looking to the law of wrongful death
in deciding the issue presented by this point on appeal
by reliance on Kihner v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529
P.2d 706 (1975), and Justiss v. Atchison, 139 Cal.Rptr.
565 P.2d 122 (1977)

(Brief of Appellant, page 7).

Both

of these cases hold that a parent cannot recover under a
wrongful death statute for a defendant's negligence
causing a stillbirth.

These cases represent the distinct

minority position in American law.
Under the common law, an infant could not
recover in tort for prenatal injuries on the ground that
a fetus en ventre sa mere was only a part of his mother.
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The rule was announced as part of American jurisprudence
by Justice Holmes in Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass.
14, 52 Am.Rep. 242 (1884).

This decision was followed by

other jurisdictions, and not questioned until Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900),
Justice Boggs, in dissent, criticized the rule as
unscientific and unsound.

No case allowed recovery until

1946, when " • • • a rapid series of cases, many of them
expressly overruling prior holdings, have brought about
what was up till that time the most spectacular abrupt
reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the
law of torts."
(4th ed. 1971).

Prosser, Handbook on the Law of Torts

336

Professor Prosser has observed, " • • • it

is now apparently literally true that there is no authority
left still supporting the older rule {that an infant cannot
recover for prenatal injuries),"

id. at 337, and that "all

writers who have discussed the problem have joined in
maintaining that the unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother.
Id. at 336.

Although the right of an infant to recover in

tort for prenatal injuries is no longer questioned, there

is a split of authority as to whether a parent may recover in
wrongful death for the stillbirth of her/his child.

In

Justiss, supra at 565 P.2d 125, nn. 4,5, the court indicated
that 25 jurisdictions now allow recovery, while only 12 deny
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"

recovery.

The highest courts of two states have

recent~

reversed prior holdings and have allowed recovery in wror
ful death for negligently causing a stillbirth.

Mone v,

Greyhound Lines, 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass 1975), overruling
Leccesse v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1972); Evans v.
Olsen, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976), overruling Padillmv v.
Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (1967).

The holdings in these cases

offer a useful analogy to the issue presented by this
point on appeal.

An action for wrongful death, like the

definition of automobile homicide in Utah, is a statutor
creation and independent of the common law.

The issue

resolved by these cases is whether the legislatures
intended to include unborn viable fetuses within the ten
"person" or "minor children" in wrongful death statutes.
A

majority of American jurisdictions have concluded that

unborn persons are indeed "persons" within the

meaning~

a relevant statute, and have imposed liability for
negligently causing the "person's" death.

The aptness

of the analogy of the wrongful death statutes is made ev1
more clear by the fact that, in some jurisdictions, wron1
death statutes are not compensatory but penal with the
amount of damages depending entirely on the defendant's
culpability and not upon the plaintiff's loss.

The

Alabama Supreme Court, for example, has described its
wrongful death statute as entirely penal and quasi-crimD
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and has not hesitated to impose liability for causing the
death of an unborn viable fetus.

Eich v. Town of Gulf

Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354, 357 (1974).
The cases advance a number of reasons for
including unborn viable fetuses within the coverage of
the wrongful death statutes.

First is a conclusion that

the legislatures intended the terms "person" or "minor
child" to include an unborn fetus.

See Libbee v. Permanente

Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, 639, reh. denied 520 P.2d 361 (Ore.
1974).

Another reason for allowing recovery is that a

denial of recovery for a stillborn child is logically
inconsistent with allowing recovery for other prenatal
injuries.

Stidham v. Ashmore, 11 Ohio App.2d 383, 167

N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959).

A live birth requirement would

produce other inconsistencies.

As was pointed out in

Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77 (4th
Cir. 1964), the live birth rule means that the graver
the harm influcted to a fetus, the greater the wrongdoer's
chance of immunity.

The rationale of all the decisions

was well summarized by the court in Chrisafogeogis v.
Brandenburg, 55 Ill.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1973):
"To hold, as a matter of law
that no viable fetus has any
separate existence which the
law will recognize is for the
law to deny a simple and easily
demonstrable fact."
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In short, the rule allowing recovery in tort for prenab
death is supported by reason, science and the weight of
authority.
This Court has not yet ruled on the question

~

whether recovery is permitted under Utah's Wrongful Deat:
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (1953), for the death 1
an unborn child.
114

In Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 534, 132 P.21

(1942), this Court held that damages could not be

awarded for the loss of a child which was not viable.
In Nelson v. Patterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975), this
Court expressly reserved judgment on the issue.

Two

justices dissented and stated:
"Our case of Webb v. Snow is not
applicable for two reasons: First, the
operative facts are completely distinguishable and we would not do an
injustice to stare decisis for the
reason that the concept advanced by
that case is no longer a part of the
weight of authority in this country.
Additionally, I see no moral, biological
or legal rationale for sustaining an
outmoded, dry rule laced with the
fiction of a bygone era." 542 P.2d at
1079.
A conclusion that an unborn viable fetus is a
"person" who can be the victim of a wrongful death compe
the conclusion that an unborn viable fetus is a "person'
who can be the victim of a homicide.

See The Unborn chl

Consistency in the Law, 2 Suffolk L. Rev. 228, 242-243
(1968).
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Respondent submits that the weight of authority
and the better reasoned cases hold that a fetus is a person
for the purposes of wrongful death.

These authorities

rejected a well-established but outmoded tort rule requiring
live birth to reach this result.

Respondent submits that

the live birth requirement for homicide is outmoded for
substantially the same reasons.

Respondent urges this

Court to recognize the trend of the law in this area and
to reject the obsolete live birth definition of "person."
Appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
C.

THE AUTHORITY CITED BY APPELLANT IS NOT

APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
Appellant has cited the following cases in
support of his contention that proof of a live birth is
required for a homicide conviction:

Commonwealth v. Edelin,

359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d
619, 87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v.
Dickenson, 28 Ohio. St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971);
State v. Gyles, 303 So.2d 799 (La. 1975).

Respondent

submits that these authorities are not applicable to
the case at bar.

Edelin is not applicable because the

court in that caae did not construe the meaning of any
term in a statutory definition of homicide.

In Massachusetts,

there is no statutory definition of manslaughter (the crime
charged in that case) and the court's decision was controlled
by the common law which requires a live birth.

The common

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

law is not involved in this appeal.
§

Utah Code Ann.

76-1-105 (Supp. 1977).
The three remaining cases are distinguishable

because the courts in those cases were declaring the
intents of different legislatures as determined by an
examination of statutes with distinct legislative
histories.

The cases of Keeler v. Superior Court and

State v. Dickenson are distinguishable on additional
grounds.

As was pointed out in Point IB above, a rule

in tort allowing recovery for prental death impels the
conclusion that an unborn viable fetus can be the victh
of a homicide.

In State v. Dickenson, the prosecution

argued that inasmuch as an intermediate appellate court
in Ohio had recognized prenatal wrongful death, the Ohio
Supreme Court should recognize prenatal homicide.

The

Supreme Court stated that it did not feel bound by the
lower court decision, and went on to state:
" • • • the definition of a
word in a civil statute does not
necessarily import the same
meaning to the same word in interpreting a criminal statute. The
result may be desireable, but
criminal statutes unlike civil
statutes, must be strictly
construed against the state."
275 N.E.2d at 602.
In short, the court sought to justify its narr
construction of the word "person" and its inconsistent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

treatment of the fetus in tort and criminal law on the
basis of a rule of strict construction.
cannot apply in this jurisdiction.

This rationale

Utah Code Ann.

§

76-1-106 (Supp. 1977), states:
"The rule that a penal
statute is to be strictly
construed shall not apply to
this code, any of its provisions,
or any offense defined by the laws
of this state. All provisions of
this code and offenses defined by
the laws of this state shall be
construed according to the
fair import of their terms, to
promote justice and to effect the
objects of the law and general
purposes (of the criminal code)."
Contrary to the Dickenson court, this Court must construe
the word "another" in the automobile homicide statute
according its fair import, and not give it a technical
common law meaning.
In Keeler v •. Superior Court, supra, the central
premise is that the California Legislature did not intend
to include a viable fetus within the meaning of the term
"human being."

That premise is demonstrably in error,

because the California Legislature, in response to the
Keeler decision, amended its statutory definition of murder
to read, "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being or
a fetus with malice aforethought."
Ann. § 187 (a)

(Pocket Part).

West's Cal. Pen. Code

The Keeler decision was, in

effect, overruled by the legislature.
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Justice Burke's dissent in Keeler is

thought~

and well written and bears directly on the issue
by this appeal.

prese~

Justice Burke notes that although the

common law required a live birth to establish a homicide
the killing of a viable unborn fetus was still considere
a serious crime under the common law.

470 P.2d at 631,

Justice Burke also argued that the legal concept of
"human being" should change with the advance of medical
science, and proposed the following analogy.

At common

law, a person could not be convicted of the murder of
a person whose heart had ceased to beat, because such a
person would be considered already dead, given the state
of medical science.

In modern times, a person whose hea

had ceased to beat might, under proper circumstances, be
revived by modern medical techniques.

Such a person cou

no longer be considered dead, and therefore could be the
victim of a homicide.

Similarly, the law should keep

stride with the advances in medicine which can protect
the life of the fetus and recognize life as beginning
prior to birth.

470 P.2d at 631.

Respondent submits that the authority cited
by appellant is not persuasive, and asks that his convic

tion be affirmed.

··22-
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POINT II
INCLUDING A VIABLE FETUS WITHIN THE MEANING
OF "ANOTHER" IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-207 (SUPP. 1977),
DOES NOT DEPRIVE APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
Appellant contends that the lower court's
ruling that a viable fetus is "another" within the
meaning of the automobile homicide statute was an
"unforseeable judicial enlargement" of a criminal
statute, and that the application of the statute to
him would be ex post facto and a denial of due process.
This argument has two weaknesses.

First, the lower

court's construction of the statute was not an "enlargement" of the statute and was not "unforseeable."
Respondent submits that the ruling below was in harmony
with the legislative intent and cannot be viewed as
an expansion of the statute's coverage (see Point IA,
supra).

Respondent further submits that, inasmuch as

a majority of

American jurisdictions consider a fetus

to be a person, the lower court's construction of the
term "another" is neither unforseeable, unusual nor
unfair to the appellant (see Point IB, supra).
The second flaw in appellant's argument is
that, assuming the lower court's ruling was an unforseeable
enlargement of the statute, it did not affect the portion
of the statute which defines criminal conduct.

Certain
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kinds of criminal conduct are punished differently
depending upon the result produced by the conduct,
rather than on differences in the criminal conduct
itself.

For examplP., if A and B independently fired

weapons at X with the intent to kill X, but only
A's aim was true, A would be guilty of murder, while
B could only be guilty of a lesser offense (i.e.,

attempted murder, or assault).

In this case, there

is no dispute over the definition of appellant's

criminal conduct (operating a motor vehicle in a
negligent fashion while intoxicated) but over the
definition of the culpable result (causing the death
of "another").

Appellant made no attempt to conform

his conduct to the known and unmistakable requirements

of law, and he was not "

• required at peril of life,

liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of
penal statutes."

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.

347, 351 (1964).

It is a fiction to suggest that if

appellant had known that the automobile homicide statute
would punish the killing of unborn persons he would not
have engaged in the conduct for which he was convicted.
Compare Keeler v. Superior Court at 470 P.2d 633 (Burke,
J. dissenting):

-24-
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"Aside from the absurdity
of the underlying premise that
defendant consulted Coke, Blackstone
or Hale before kicking [the unborn
victim] to death, it is clear that
defendant had adequate notice that
his act could constitute homicide.
Due process only precludes prosecution under a new statute insufficiently
explicit regarding the specific conduct
proscribed, or under a pre-existing
statute 'by means of an unforseeable
enlargement thereof.'"
Respondent submits that appellant received the
"fair warning" required by due process and that his
conviction should be affirmed.
POINT III
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF
HIS CONVICTION ON THE GROUNDS OF INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE AS TO THE VIABILITY OF THE VICTIM.
A.

APPELLANT HAS NOT PROPERLY PRESERVED THIS

POINT FOR APPEAL.
At the conclusion of the State's case, the
appellant moved for a dismissal on the grounds that a
viable fetus is not "another" within the meaning of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 1977)

(T.74).

The

record on appeal does not indicate that appellant ever
directed the lower court's attention to the claimed
insufficiency of evidence of viability by way of a
motion to dismiss, for a directed verdict, a new trial,
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or an arrest of judgment.

There is consequently no

ruling or order below which appellant can claim
erroneous.

Principles of appellate review prevent this

Court from hearing a claim of error for the first time
on appeal.
(1972).

State v. Carter, 27 Utah 2d 416, 497 P.2d

~

Respondent submits that appellant has not

properly preserved this point for appeal.
B.

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH

THE JURY COULD FIND THAT THE VICTIM WAS A VIABLE FETUS.
The fundamental rule governing a claim of
insufficient evidence on appeal is that the evidence

a~

all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdic:
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977).

In this case,

the jury heard the testimony of a medical expert that ti
victim was of average size for a fetus in the 26th wecl
of gestation and that its weight was approximately one
and one half pounds.

Viability occurs at different tim1

in differentpregnancies, but usually occurs between the
24th and 28th week.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (19'

Some medical authorities feel that viability occurs ew
earlier, and viability has been defined to mean "capabi
of living; the state of being viable; usually connotes
fetus that has reached 500 grams in weight (about 1.1
pounds) and 20 gestational weeks."

Stedmen's Medical
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Dictionary 1388 (22nd ed. 1972), as quoted in Viability
and Abortion, 64 Ky. L. J. 146, 148 n. 14 (1975).

The

concept of viability does not require that the fetus have
a better than even chance of survival.

Rather, it

suggests that stage of development where the fetus has
a reasonable chance of survival.
76-7-302 (3)

(Supp. 1977).

Utah Code Ann.

§

Respondent submits that there

was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the
victim was viable, and appellant's conviction should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellant has been
convicted under a correct interpretation of the automobile
homicide statute which includes a viable fetus as "another,"
that appellant's right to due process of law has not been
violated, and that appellant is not entitled to a reversal
because of insufficiency of evidence.

Appellant's

conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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